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The Impact of Scotland’s Prospective 
Membership of the EU on the 2014 
Referendum Debate: Concerns over Borders
The issue of  Scotland’s borders played a major role in the 2014 Scottish 
independence campaign insofar as they aroused many concerns about 
their evolution in the advent of  an independent Scotland which would 
be part of  the European Union (EU). Three main questions were raised: 
would Scotland be required to join the Schengen Area as a condition of  
EU membership? Would it be able to remain part of  the Common Travel 
Area (CTA)? Would it be able to manage its borders? Scotland’s prospec-
tive EU membership gave rise to much uncertainty and increased some 
of  the fears linked to the prospect of  Scotland becoming an independent 
country.
Obviously, if  one UK nation becomes independent, it will have an 
impact on the UK’s borders and on the borders of  the new independent 
country with the rest of  the UK insofar as the borders of  the independent 
country become international borders. An international border can be 
defined as “a line dividing land territory, over which States exercise full 
territorial sovereignty”, implying that the new state has to control its bor-
ders (Caflish, 2006, p. 1). Indeed, according to the Weberian definition 
of  the state as an entity which holds the “legitimate use of  physical force 
in the enforcement of  its order” (Weber, 2002, p. 118), borders and their 
states are “separate but related political structures” (Wilson & Donnan, 
2000, p. 10). This means that borders do not only refer to (1) the legal 
borderline which separates and joins states, but also to the following two 
elements:
(2)  the physical structures of  the state—composed of  people and insti-
tutions—which exist to demarcate and protect the borderline;
(3)  frontiers, territorial zones which “stretch across and away from 
borders, within which people negotiate a variety of  behaviours and 




This paper will focus on the first two elements since the debate about 
Scotland’s borders focused on the need for an independent Scotland to 
control its borders.
Indeed, independence for Scotland gave rise to fears about illegal 
immigration since an independent Scotland might not be able to manage 
its borders—this concern was probably strengthened by the migrant crisis 
in the Mediterranean. As made clear in the document entitled Scotland 
Analysis: Borders and Citizenship which was published by the British gov-
ernment in 2014 1, external borders needed to be controlled carefully in 
order to achieve a balance between the promotion of  migration or trade, 
for example, and the protection against any type of  threats, such as ter-
rorism (HM Government, 2014, p. 15).
As already mentioned, the fears linked to the prospect of  Scotland 
becoming an independent country were strengthened by EU member-
ship. Since the 1980s the SNP had always promised that an independent 
Scotland would be a full member of  the EU and the Scottish govern-
ment (led by Alex Salmond, the SNP leader until November 2014) did 
not change this policy when it won the Scottish Parliament election in 
May 2011. If  Scotland had voted in favour of  independence on 18 Sep-
tember 2014, it would have tried to be part of  the EU—even though 
there was much uncertainty about whether Scotland would have retained 
its membership or would have had to reapply for it.
This paper will consequently examine how the concerns about Scot-
land’s independence and its prospective EU membership were intertwined 
and impacted upon the referendum debate as far as borders were con-
cerned. Scotland’s borders include land and maritime boundaries. The 
Anglo-Scottish land border, which was established in 1237 by the Treaty 
of  York, was particularly brought to the fore in the context of  the inde-
pendence referendum since it would have become an international border 
had Scotland become independent. Scotland’s maritime borders were 
also alluded to in this debate but they seemed to be less contentious. 2
I will begin by explaining why EU membership has been a key element 
of  the SNP policy since the late 1980s before focusing on the problem 
  1. Contrary to the Scottish government which focused mostly on its White Paper on independ-
ence, Scotland’s Future, the British government produced a series of  documents dealing with issues 
linked to the Scottish independence referendum from February 2013 onwards.
  2. Maritime borders were mentioned in this debate because they would have had to be defined 
according to international law and bilateral negotiations between an independent Scotland and the 
continuing UK. Furthermore, a great part of  the UK’s oil reserves lie within these borders. One 
should note that Scotland being no independent state, it has no international maritime boundaries 
today—even if  the extent of  the respective jurisdictions of  England, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland in the maritime zones of  the UK have been defined by several Acts and Orders (HM Gov-
ernment, 2014, p. 19; Scottish Government, 2013b, p. 557).
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raised by a possible requirement for Scotland (which is today a member 
of  the CTA) to join the Schengen Area as part of  EU membership. The 
article will then examine the concerns aroused by these issues during the 
referendum debate, analysing the main arguments used by the national-
ists and the pro-Union side. Finally, I will try to assess to what extent these 
concerns were justified.
I will not deal with the citizenship issue even though Scotland’s inde-
pendence affected the way of  determining the eligibility criteria for Scot-
tish citizenship and entitlement to British citizenship.
Scotland and EU membership
Since the late 1980s the SNP (like Plaid Cymru in Wales) has tried to use 
EU membership to promote independence, as exemplified by its slogan 
“Independence in Europe”. Not only did this strategy enable the SNP 
to react to criticisms that Scotland would be too weak and isolated if  
it decided to leave the UK, but it was also a way for the party to take 
advantage of  the new initiatives launched by the European Union at that 
time. Indeed, the 1986 Single European Act had promoted regional poli-
cies and structural funds, such as the European Regional Development 
Fund, which aimed at correcting regional disparities and at including 
sub- national government levels into the European decision-making pro-
cess. In 1992 this was reinforced by the subsidiarity principle introduced 
in the Maastricht Treaty: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Commu-
nity shall take action […] only if  and in so far as the objectives of  the pro-
posed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can 
therefore, by reason of  the scale or effects of  the proposed action, be better 
achieved by the Community. (Europa, 2015a)
This meant that decisions should be taken at the lowest level of  govern-
ment. Even if  this principle first only applied to relationships between 
member states and the EU, the political parties supporting devolution or 
independence, such as the SNP, tried to apply it to relationships between 
governments and sub-national governments. This was a way for them to 
legitimize the decision-making process at the sub-national government 
level. It was all the more attractive to them because the policies followed 
by the Conservative governments of  Margaret Thatcher and John Major 
did not seem to protect their interests:
Conservative unpopularity in Scotland and Wales was strengthened during 
the 18 years of  Conservative rule by policies which appeared, to many, to be 
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unsympathetic to the special needs of  the non-English parts of  the United 
Kingdom. The Thatcher government’s policies of  competitive individualism 
and the free market seemed inappropriate to the more communally orien-
tated societies of  Scotland and Wales. Conservative rule seemed, to many 
Scots, to be alien rule. Particularly resented in Scotland was the community 
charge, popularly known as the poll tax, which was implemented in Scotland 
before it was tried in England, even though the vast majority of  Scottish MPs 
had voted against it in the House of  Commons. (Bogdanor, 2012, p. 91)
The strategy adopted by the SNP also reflected the “multi-level gov-
ernance” theory which had been popularized by Gary Marks, political 
scientist, at that time. “Multi-level governance” called into question the 
neofunctionalist and realist strategies, 3 which had been developed in 
the 1950s and 1960s, by highlighting the complex network of  inter-
actions noticeable at the European level: “European integration is a 
polity- creating process in which authority and policy-making influence 
are shared across multiple levels of  government—subnational, national, 
and supranational” (Hooghe & Marks, 2001, p. 2). More precisely, this 
theory insisted on the roles played by the following institutions in the 
European decision-making process: (1) the supranational actors, particu-
larly the European Commission, (2) the national state institutions, par-
ticularly the government, and (3) the sub-national governments. Applied 
to Scotland, this meant that the SNP (at the sub-national government 
level) could use the European level to make its voice heard so as to get 
more power and legitimacy, and bypass the British State (at the national 
level). From then on, devolution and the European issue were linked 
(Bulmer et al., 2006, p. 91).
Despite these changes, remaining part of  the UK has resulted in a 
limited voice for Scotland on EU matters, even after the setting-up of  
the devolved administration in 1999. Indeed, questions concerning the 
EU are not devolved issues, but reserved matters—the Scottish Executive 
is not allowed to take decisions on such matters. Furthermore, Scottish 
ministers find it hard to promote Scottish interests at EU level because 
they are not always consulted nor invited to attend meetings where key 
  3. According to the neofunctionalist theory, based on the work of  political scientist Ernst Haas, 
national interest groups, bureaucrats and elites—rather than national governments—played a key role 
in the decision-making process at the European level: “Political integration is the process whereby 
political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations 
and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over 
the pre-existing national states.” (Haas, 1958, p. 16) In reaction to this theory, the realist strategy, 
founded by political scientists such as Stanley Hoffmann, had insisted on the role played by national 
governments in the European political system, considering that the State retained most of  its capacity 
for national choice in the European integration process.
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decisions are made on UK policy in EU matters—including those deal- 
ing with devolved responsibilities (House of  Commons, 2010, p. 36). 
Finally, the priorities highlighted by the UK Permanent Representation 
(UKREP) in Brussels often diverge from Scotland’s EU priorities, par-
ticularly as far as environmental policies are concerned:
Environmental policies are a salient example of  the lack of  representation 
that Scotland suffers and the difficulties that it encounters in attempting to 
further its own interests. Although the Scottish Parliament has important 
powers in terms of  environmental policies, the permeability of  that field’s 
boundaries often means that the Scottish Government has to abandon cer-
tain projects because of  the cross references between environmental issues 
and matters reserved to Westminster. (Simpkins, 2015, pp. 6–7)
One should also note that, being part of  the UK means that Scot-
land has to respect the same opt-outs as those negotiated by the Major 
government in the 1990s, i.e. the opt-out on the single currency and the 
Schengen Area. Thus, Scotland—like the rest of  the UK—did not join 
the Schengen Area but decided to remain part of  the Common Travel 
Area (CTA). The latter, which was set up after the partition of  Ireland 
in 1922, ensures free movement for nationals of  the UK and Ireland 
and enables the “UK, the Republic of  Ireland, the Channel Islands and 
the Isle of  Man [to] collaborate on border policies and practices as part 
of  the CTA” (Ryan, 2014, pp. 158–9). The creation of  this area, which 
works, in practice, in a similar manner as the Schengen Area, had been 
suggested to the Irish Free State by the British government in 1922 because 
they refused to impose passport and immigration checks at the UK-Irish 
border.
These two opt-outs have always been problematic for the SNP. 4 The 
lack of  clarity on these two issues was stressed during the 2014 Scottish 
independence campaign. Although Scotland could be required to join the 
Schengen Area as a condition of  EU membership, the SNP had made it 
clear quite early that it planned to remain part of  the CTA, as exempli-
fied by SNP Home Office Affairs spokesman Pete Wishart’s statement in 
March 2012: “The reality is that an independent Scotland will be part 
of  the common travel area which already exists within and between the 
UK and Ireland.” (BBC, 2012) The SNP documents published in the 
context of  the independence referendum repeated these ideas (Scottish 
Government, 2013a, p. 13). This policy objective seemed to be based 
on two factors: not only did the Scottish government wish to adopt the 
  4. The SNP has now abandoned the idea of  having its own currency (because of  the euro crisis) 
but has hesitated between joining the euro or keeping the pound over the past few years.
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same attitude as the Republic of  Ireland (which is no longer part of  the 
UK, but has been part of  the CTA since the 1920s) but they also wanted 
to protect “the integrity of  the current social union” (ibid., pp. 99–100, 
p. v). This “social union”, which refers to “the expression of  the close 
economic, social and cultural ties that exist across the nations of  the UK 
(including the Isle of  Man and the Channel Islands) and Ireland” (ibid., 
p. 96), was a principle which had been expressed by Alex Salmond since 
2013. 5 According to the SNP, this social union was not threatened by an 
independent Scotland since it would be stronger thanks to a new part-
nership and the continued free movement of  nationals between Scotland 
and the rest of  the UK (rUK) and Ireland (ibid.). There was no certainty 
that the SNP policy objective would be accepted by the British govern-
ment though, as explained later in this paper.
Scotland’s prospective EU membership: Schengen area vs cTa
Today, twenty-two EU member states, are part of  the Schengen Area. 
The UK and Ireland have always refused to join it. The opt-out was 
negotiated by the Major government and it has never been called into 
question so far. This reluctance can be mostly explained by the terrorist 
threat (and the need to control the movement of  terrorists and weapons) 
as well as by the insular nature of  these countries (Watts & Pilkington, 
2005, p. 183).
The Schengen Area was created following a first agreement signed 
between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Ger-
many in 1985, and a further convention signed in June 1990. When it 
took effect in 1995, checks at the internal borders of  the signatory states 
were abolished (nationals of  EU member states, which had agreed to be 
part of  the Schengen Area, could travel between the countries which 
had also decided to join this Area without a passport and border con-
trols). Furthermore, a single external border “where immigration checks 
for the Schengen Area [were] carried out in accordance with identical 
procedures” was created (Europa, 2015b). Not only did the Schengen 
Area entail the removal of  border checks at the internal borders as well 
as common rules applying to people crossing the external borders of  the 
EU member states but also the harmonization of  the conditions of  entry 
  5. In mid-2013, former First Minister Alex Salmond made six major speeches to explain an inde-
pendent Scotland’s place in an interdependent world. He stressed that Scotland (as part of  the UK) 
was a member of  six unions: the political and economic union, the social union, the currency union, 
the union of  the crowns, the defence union through NATO, and the European Union. The Scottish 
government wanted to remain part of  five of  these unions, except the political and economic union.
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and of  the rules on visas for short stays, enhanced police cooperation, 
stronger judicial cooperation through a faster extradition system and 
transfer of  enforcement of  criminal judgments, as well as the establish-
ment and development of  the Schengen Information System (SIS) 6.
As already mentioned, Scotland has been part of  the CTA since the 
1920s, which means that within this area there is one external border 
which is managed by the UK. This would be called into question if  Scot-
land was required to join the Schengen Area as a condition of  EU mem-
bership. According to the Schengen requirements, there would have to be 
immigration controls at the borders with the rest of  the UK and Ireland, 
which would include: “crossings at the land border between England and 
Scotland, ferry crossings between Northern Ireland and Scottish ports 
and flights between Scotland and other parts of  the UK” (HM Govern-
ment, 2014, p. 34). Indeed, Scotland would have a (land, sea and air) 
border with an EU member state which is not in the Schengen Area. 
As averred by the Conservative Minister for Immigration and Security, 
James Brokenshire, in April 2014, the current regime of  free and unin-
terrupted travel between Scotland and the rest of  the UK would change:
If  Scotland were part of  the EU and part of  Schengen, in those circum-
stances it would be under an obligation to secure the external Schengen 
border. Therefore, it could itself  be under obligations to put in place border 
checks, border controls and everything that that brings with it. (Ibid., p. 27)
The SNP has clearly said that it would like to remain in the CTA 
but there would be no automatic entry. Negotiations would be needed 
between the British government and an independent Scotland: “Negoti-
ations over the Common Travel Area would have to take place between 
Scotland and the UK, before Scotland could begin negotiations over an 
opt-out with the EU. One potential flash-point for dispute between Scot-
land and the UK is immigration.” (Ibid., p. 26) There would be no auto-
matic opt-out of  the Schengen Area for Scotland either. A great number 
of  researchers share the viewpoint that Scotland could be required to join 
the Schengen Area as part of  EU membership. 7 For example, Robert E. 
Wright, Professor of  Economics in the Strathclyde Business School, 
insisted that being part of  this passport-free travel zone was now the 
norm in the EU, particularly as the non-EU countries, like Norway or 
  6. “The SIS is a highly efficient large-scale information system that supports external border con-
trol and law enforcement cooperation in the Schengen States. The SIS enables competent author-
ities, such as police and border guards, to enter and consult alerts on certain categories of  wanted or 
missing persons and objects.” (European Commission)
  7. This was confirmed by an EU constitutional affairs expert in September 2014 (Banks, 2014).
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Iceland, decided to join it in 2001. Besides, there have been no opt-outs 
of  Schengen since Ireland and the UK in 1997 (Wright, 2013, pp. 52–3). 
Michael Keating added in 2013:
What is clear is that Scotland, whether remaining in as a successor state or 
joining as a new member, would have to accept the acquis. Special dispen-
sations and opt-outs are only available to existing members at the time of  
negotiating new policies. (Keating, 2013, p. 134)
Not only would all member states have to agree to the terms of  Scot-
tish membership before it could join the EU, but this would also include 
favourable terms or opt-outs Scotland would like to be granted (House 
of  Commons, 2014, p. 24). There were consequently few clear answers 
to the Scotland and EU/Schengen Area dilemma.
The threats of border controls and differing immigration 
policies
During the referendum campaign the question of  border controls was 
raised regularly because of  the lack of  clarity on this issue and the fears 
aroused by the prospect of  a poorly managed border between England 
and Scotland. This was not the first time such an argument had been 
made: these fears had been expressed since 2012. In March 2012, for 
example, in an interview with the BBC’s Sunday Politics Scotland, British 
Home Secretary Theresa May had suggested that:
If  there was a separate Scotland there could very well be some sort of  border 
check, but what that would be, to what extent that would be necessary, would 
depend on the issues about whether Scotland was in Schengen. (BBC, 2012)
Nevertheless, the prospect of  the referendum further increased these 
concerns.
This was exemplified by the statements made by several leading pol-
iticians, supporting the Better Together campaign 8 and calling for the 
re-establishment of  border controls at the Anglo-Scottish border, thus 
reviving thoughts of  the Hadrian’s Wall built to separate the Romans 
  8. “Better Together” was the main umbrella organisation of  the “No” camp during the ref-
erendum campaign, including the Scottish Conservative Party, the Scottish Labour Party and the 
Scottish Liberal Democrats. It was established in June 2012 with support of  the three main British 
parties. On the other hand, the “Yes Scotland” campaign, which was launched in Edinburgh on 
25 May 2012, was an umbrella group rallying political parties, non-party organisations as well as 
individuals supporting independence. The campaign was an alliance of  the governing Scottish 
National Party, the Scottish Green Party, and the Scottish Socialist Party.
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from the Picts—a comparison repeatedly made in this debate (ITV, 2014; 
Peers, 2014). In March 2014 Theresa May stated that: “The British gov-
ernment would expect passport checks between Scotland and England 
if  a looser immigration policy were adopted north of  the border after 
independence.” (Carrell, 2014) In June 2014 Labour leader Ed Miliband 
said that if  he was in power, his government “would consider building 
border posts” if  Scotland became independent and “would have to look 
at the issue of  a border if  the Scottish government achieved its goal of  a 
looser immigration policy” (BBC, 2014a). This viewpoint was confirmed 
by David Cameron in September 2014 (Dearden, 2014).
As referred to in the above mentioned quotes, the question of  pass-
ports and border controls was not the only problem. What also seemed 
sensitive was the prospect of  a loose immigration policy adopted by an 
independent Scotland and, above all, the concern that immigration rules 
for both sides of  the border would not be the same. Immigration thus 
emerged as another major issue in this campaign. Ed Miliband made 
it clear in June 2014: “It totally stands to reason. If  you have markedly 
different immigration policies, obviously that becomes an issue between 
Scotland and the rest of  the UK.” (BBC, 2014a). These fears were also 
alluded to by Theresa May:
Buried deep in Alex Salmond’s white paper is the admission that, just like the 
last Labour government, a separate Scotland would pursue a looser immigra-
tion policy. That would undermine the work we have done since 2010, and 
the continuing UK could not allow Scotland to become a convenient landing 
point for migration into the United Kingdom. (Cited in Carrell, 2014)
Ed Miliband and Theresa May consequently highlighted that Scotland’s 
more open immigration policy could create a “back door” for entry into 
England, implying that people might travel to Scotland and then try 
to move south to England. Such a concern was justified insofar as the 
 Cameron-Clegg government and the SNP did not seem to be willing to 
follow the same immigration policies.
The Cameron-Clegg government had adopted a tough stance on 
immigration since May 2010. In their coalition programme, they had 
declared that immigration had to be controlled:
The Government believes that immigration has enriched our culture and 
strengthened our economy, but that it must be controlled […]. We also re- 
cognize that to ensure cohesion and protect our public services, we need to 
introduce a cap on immigration and reduce the number of  non-EU immi-
grants. (HM Government, 2010, p. 21)
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As long as the UK remained in the EU, the government could do little 
or nothing in terms of  immigration policy to impact EU migrant flows 
to (or from) the UK. Consequently, it suggested other measures such as: 
an annual limit on the number of  non-EU economic migrants, the rein-
troduction of  exit checks or action to reduce abuse of  the immigration 
system by students (Benyon, 2011, p. 141). On 23 November 2010 Home 
Secretary Theresa May made this objective quite clear when she said 
that the aim was to reduce annual non-EU migration “from the hun-
dreds of  thousands [196,000 in 2009], back down to the tens of  thou-
sands” (May, 2010). For example, she announced new rules aimed at 
setting an annual limit of  21,700 (a decrease by 6,300) for tier-one and 
tier-two migrants, particularly reducing tier-one migration, i.e. migrants 
without job offers, and at increasing financial maintenance thresholds 
for entry. She also focused on non-EU students who represented “almost 
two thirds of  the non-EU migrants entering the UK each year” (ibid.). 
It was proposed that student visas would be limited to degree level with 
a more onerous regime for students at public and private colleges so as 
to cut the number of  student visas issued each year—a cut of  around 
40% was expected (Benyon, 2011, p. 141). In an article published in Feb-
ruary 2015, Jonathan Portes tried to assess the coalition government’s 
record on immigration. He highlighted that, even though the coalition 
government had not succeeded in reducing non-EU migration to the tens 
of  thousands, they had managed to cut significantly student migration:
The promise to cut net migration to the ‘tens of  thousands’ was generally 
regarded by immigration policy experts as unachievable, or achievable only 
at an economic cost no sensible government was willing to pay. In practice, 
the latter course was never tested: resistance from within government from 
the Department of  Business, supported to a greater or lesser extent by the 
Treasury, meant that even non-EU migration was only reduced very substan-
tially for non-HE [Higher Education] students; for most other routes it has 
stabilised. Non-EU net migration is currently about 150,000 a year, slightly 
higher than EU net migration.
This does not mean the policy changes had no impact: the increase in the 
regulatory burden on business and the education sector has been substantial, 
and has certainly resulted in some reduction in skilled and student migration. 
The most damaging single decision was probably the closing of  the Post-
Study Work Route 9. However, overall, any economic damage was consider-
ably mitigated. (Portes, 2015)
  9. This visa route, which was closed in 2012, allowed international students to work for up to two 
years after their studies.
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If  the immigration policy of  the British government was rather tough, 
the policy suggested by the SNP—in the advent of  an independent Scot-
land—seemed loose. Indeed, in June 2014 Alex Salmond hinted that 
Scotland would need to encourage immigration in order to expand the 
workforce and to finance the state pension (this amounted to a rise of  
10%, from about 22,000 to 24,000 migrants a year)—a policy quite dif-
ferent from that of  the British government (Herald Scotland, 2014). This 
was also clearly mentioned in the document entitled Scotland’s Future since 
the Scottish government explained that they would introduce new meas-
ures in this field in order to meet the Scottish needs:
Scotland’s differing demographic and migration needs mean that the cur-
rent UK immigration system has not served our interests. This Government 
plans, following independence, a points-based immigration system, targeted 
at particular Scottish needs. The system will enable us to meet the needs of  
Scottish society with greater flexibility. For example, it could provide incen-
tives to migrants who move to live and work in remoter geographical areas 
[of  Scotland]. (Scottish Government, 2013b, p. 16)
The SNP considered a rise in immigration, which would contribute to 
population growth, as essential to Scotland’s economy (ibid., p. 267). Thus, 
the SNP wanted to reintroduce the post-study work visa to attract high 
quality international students and encourage more foreign graduates 
to remain in Scotland after finishing further education (ibid., p. 256). 
Furthermore, they planned to lower the current financial maintenance 
thresholds and minimum salary levels for entry so as to encourage skilled 
individuals to move to Scotland (ibid., p. 270).
Limited room for manoeuvre
These differing priorities in terms of  immigration policies could have 
been problematic if  Scotland had become independent. Nevertheless, 
tensions should not be exaggerated. Indeed, Scotland would probably 
have remained part of  the EU and/or of  the CTA, which means that it 
would not really have been able to decide its own immigration rules. 10 
The Scottish government seemed to be well aware of  these constraints. 
Thus, in Scotland’s Future, they highlighted that negotiations would be 
needed if  Scotland was to remain part of  the CTA:
  10. As a country part of  the UK, Scotland has never been able to decide its immigration policy, 
which is one of  “the reserved powers”. Immigration policy is decided by the British Government.
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The current CTA between the UK and Ireland is based on administrative 
arrangements […] These arrangements are reflected in the UK’s immigra-
tion laws (and those of  the Republic of  Ireland) and could be replicated by 
an independent Scotland in due course. Within the CTA, an independent 
Scotland will work with the Westminster and Irish Governments to ensure 
that visa and immigration controls meet certain shared standards. The detail 
of  this would require negotiation but full harmonization is not required. 
(Ibid., p. 224)
Regarding the EU, one should not forget that Scotland, like the UK 
and other EU member states, has to follow the rules which are embodied 
in the Lisbon Treaty and which are enforced by Directives and Regu-
lations, “the most important forms of  binding EU Law issued by the 
European Union Council of  Ministers and the European Parliament” 
(Wright, 2013, p. 47). Scotland has to respect the treaty provisions relating 
to freedom of  movement for citizens of  member states and to allow EU 
citizens to enter the country as the UK presently does. This would also 
mean, as mentioned by Jim Gallagher that:
[…] as a member of  the EU, the views of  other member states on substantial 
in migration from third countries would be a constraint. An independent 
Scotland would have to adopt the EU’s common approach to migration and 
the resultant harmonisation of  immigration and asylum policies. (Gallagher, 
2013, p. 4)
The two main principles of  the EU immigration policies are based on: 
“defining a balanced approach to immigration” so as to deal with legal 
migration and fight illegal immigration, and respecting “the principle of  
solidarity and fair sharing of  responsibility” (Europa, 2015c). Scotland 
would have to respect these principles as well as the new measures pro-
posed by the European Commission to solve the migration problems, and 
more particularly the crisis in the Mediterranean—immigration having 
been made a central priority at the EU level. These constraints would 
have an impact on Scotland’s ability to determine its immigration policy: 
[…] if  Scotland were a separate, independent state it would have legal power 
over migration and citizenship issues, but in practice its scope to diverge from 
EU and UK rules and approaches would be greatly constrained in practical 
and political terms. (Ibid.)
Finally, Scotland would have to take into account the attitude of  Scot-
tish public opinion towards immigration. According to a survey of  atti-
tudes carried out by YouGov in October 2013, the majority of  Scots 
(58%) supported reductions to immigration to Scotland—even though 
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the extent of  support for such a position was stronger in England and 
Wales (75%) (Ryan, 2014, p. 163; Blinder, 2014, pp. 5–6).
Reasons for the use of the immigration issue in the 
referendum debate
Even though the concerns raised by the prospect that Scotland might not 
be able to control its borders and migration policies were exaggerated, 
they were aroused by several factors which induced the pro-UK camp to 
make immigration a major issue in the referendum campaign, as exem-
plified by Alex Salmond’s complaints that “immigration was being used 
as a ‘weapon’ to stoke up fears about independence” (BBC, 2014b).
First, immigration was one of  the main concerns of  British voters. 
According to the IPSOS-MORI polls carried out in June, July, August 
and September 2014, race/immigration was even considered as the most 
important issue facing the UK (36% of  the respondents cited it as the 
most important issue in July while economy was mentioned by 32% and 
the NHS by 27% of  the public) (IPSOS MORI, 2014).
Second, the concern over immigration was fueled by the migrant crisis 
in Calais, the nearest French port to England, from where thousands of  
migrants attempted (and still attempt) to cross the Channel in order to 
reach England. This issue particularly made the headlines in July, August, 
and in early September 2014 when about 230 illegal migrants tried to 
force their way onto a ferry bound for England (BBC, 2014c).
Third, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)’s discourse 
on immigration might have influenced the main British parties and British 
voters in this debate. Even if  this right-wing party claims it is a civic na- 
tionalist party, it supports a tough immigration policy, promising “a five-
year ban on people coming to settle in Britain while immigration policy 
is sorted out”, suggesting that “all immigrants should be banned from 
claiming benefits for five years after their arrival” or “improvements to 
border checks” in January 2014 (Wintour, 2014). This might be all the 
more likely as UKIP has become increasingly popular since 2013. One 
should not forget that the independence referendum took place a few 
months after the 2014 European elections, where UKIP gained the most 





The border and immigration issues played a major role in the Scottish 
independence campaign insofar as states and borders are inextricably 
linked and many questions remained unanswered about Scotland’s pro-
spective EU membership, membership of  the Schengen Area and mem-
bership of  the CTA. Even though it was obvious Scotland wanted to 
remain in the EU and within the CTA, uncertainty remained about what 
was possible and about the conditions for membership. This lack of  clarity 
enabled the pro-UK camp to make border checks and immigration key 
issues in the referendum campaign. Not only did they use the threat of  
border controls to make Scottish voters aware of  the impact of  inde-
pendence on Scotland’s borders, highlighting that “a literal and figura-
tive border” 11 would be created between England and Scotland, but they 
also hinted that an independent Scotland could leave the way open to a 
great number of  migrants, either because the Scottish government would 
follow looser immigration policies than the rest of  the UK or because 
Scotland’s borders would be poorly managed.
Despite the referendum defeat, the idea of  holding a referendum on 
Scottish independence has not been abandoned. In November 2014 
Nicola Sturgeon, the new SNP leader, 12 said her top priority would be 
campaigning for separation and she suggested that a second referendum 
could be organized (Johnson, 2014). If  that happened, the questions 
regarding borders and immigration would have to be settled so as to 
ensure that Scottish voters know what an independent Scotland means.
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